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The doctrine of specific etiology
Lauren N. Ross
Modern medicine is often said to have originated with 19th century germ theory, which attributed
diseases to particular bacterial contagions. The success of this theory is often associated with an
underlying principle referred to as the “doctrine of specific etiology,” which refers to the theory’s
specificity at the level of disease causation or etiology. Despite the perceived importance of this
doctrine the literature lacks a clear account of the types of specificity it involves and why exactly
they matter. This paper argues that the 19th century germ theory model involves two types of
specificity at the level of etiology. One type receives significant attention in the literature, but its
influence on modern medicine has been misunderstood. A second type is present in this model, but
it has been overlooked in the extant literature. My analysis clarifies how these types of specificity
led to a novel conception of etiology, which continues to figure in medicine today.
Unquestionably the doctrine of specific etiology has been the most constructive force in
medical research for almost a century and the theoretical and practical achievements to
which is has led constitute the bulk of modern medicine. Yet few are the cases in which it
has provided a complete account of the causation of disease....In reality...the search for
the cause may be a hopeless pursuit because most disease states are the indirect outcome
of a constellation of circumstances rather than the direct result of single determinant
factors (Dubos 1959, 102).
1 Introduction. Modern medicine is often said to have originated with various scientific achieve-
ments in the late 19th century. At this time germ theory gained favor in many scientific communities
and overshadowed earlier theories of disease. Many of these earlier theories attributed diseases to
long lists of sometimes ill-defined causal factors, while germ theory placed causal responsibility on
identifiable, material contagions such as bacteria. In particular, the research of Koch and Pasteur
led to the identification of single bacterial causes for diseases like anthrax, tuberculosis, and cholera,
which ranked among the leading causes of disease at the time. This research is often viewed as
supporting a monocausal model where single pathogenic factors are viewed as the main causes of
particular diseases.
This 19th century germ theory of disease is viewed as an important advance in medical theory,
which continues to have a lasting influence on modern medicine. The success of this theory is
typically associated with its commitment to an underlying principle referred to as the “doctrine of
specific etiology.” This phrase was coined by Rene´ Dubos (1959) in reference to the theory’s speci-
ficity at the level of disease causation or etiology. This notion of specificity is typically interpreted
as a monocausal view where particular diseases have single main causal factors. It is difficult to
overemphasize the perceived importance of this doctrine. The doctrine of specific etiology is viewed
as “the most powerful single force in the development of medicine during the past century” (Dubos
1965, 326), “a singular turning point in the history of medical thought” (Loomis and Wing 1990,
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1), “the theoretical core of modern medical ideology” (Lander 1978, 78-81), the “signature of mod-
ern Western medicine” (Mishler 1981, 7), “an assumption central to the medical practice” (Tesh
1988, 122), the “meta-narrative” of modern medical theory (Downing 2011), and a “prototype for
explaining most diseases,” which has “a lasting preeminence” in medicine today (Aronowitz 1998,
8).
There are a number of puzzles associated with the perceived importance of this doctrine. First,
it is not always clear exactly what is meant by the doctrine of specific etiology. The literature
lacks a clear account of the types of specificity present in this model and why they matter. Second,
while many scholars interpret this doctrine in terms of a monocausal picture they also admit that
most diseases have many causes and, thus, do not fit this view (Blaxter 2015). This is expressed
in Dubos’s quote from above and in the work of others who claim that the monocausal model has
“serious limitations” due to its “oversimplification” of disease causality (Locker 2003, 19) (Mishler
1981, 14). If the doctrine of specific etiology has these issues, then why is it viewed as a significant
advance in medical theory, which has led to the development of modern medicine? These puzzles
raise further questions. First, what kinds of specificity are present in this early model of disease?
Second, what makes them important and how have they influenced modern medicine, if they have
at all?
In this paper I argue that the 19th century germ theory of disease involves two types of specificity
at the level of etiology. One type receives significant attention in the literature, but its influence on
modern medicine has been misunderstood. A second type is present in this model, but it has been
completely overlooked the extant literature. My analysis discusses how these types of specificity
led to a novel conception of etiology, which continues to figure in medical theory today. This is
an effort to clarify what has been viewed as “a profound change in ideas about disease causation
that occurred in the late 19th century” (Kunitz 1987, 379). The rest of this paper is structured as
follows. Section 2 provides theoretical and historical background on conceptions of etiology with
attention to 18th and 19th century medicine. In section 3, features of the germ theory model are
discussed in more detail, including the types of specificity it contains. This section begins to suggest
how these features have influenced modern medicine, while a more detailed discussion of this is left
for section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Two questions. Etiology is derived from the Greek work for cause (“aitia”) and it refers to
the causal factors that produce disease. As causes are always relative to their effects identifying
etiological factors or disease causes requires the specification of some disease trait of interest.
This leads to an initial question of (1) how to identify and characterize distinct disease traits for
the purposes of etiological understanding. Once this question is answered, and a disease trait is
specified, a second question can be pursued, which involves (2) how to identify disease etiology or
the factors that cause a given disease.
Consider the first (1) question, which involves how to identify and characterize disease traits for
the purposes of etiological study. A general approach that has been involved in this process from
Hippocractic to modern times involves the observation of various signs and symptoms, which are
viewed as characteristic of disease.1 Individuals presenting with any one of a number of symptoms
1Technically, signs refer to features observed by a third-party (e.g. heavy-breathing, pallor, and fast heart-
rate), while symptoms refer to features experienced by a patient which cannot be observed in the same way
(e.g. nausea, pain, and fatigue). As my analysis does not rely on this distinction, I follow the common
practice of referring to both as “symptoms.”
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are often thought to be suffering from disease. These symptoms include manifestations such as
chronic cough, diarrhea, fever, vomiting, lethargy, malaise, severe pain, and skin rashes, among
many others. When these symptoms manifest in individuals they often present in particular groups
or clusters, which reoccur in different individuals with minor variations. This attention to sympto-
mology encouraged a strategy of defining disease traits on the basis of particular symptom clusters.
In the 18th and early 19th century, this symptom-based orientation commonly figured in concep-
tions of disease. For example, individuals who presented with a slow-onset of symptoms including
bleeding gums, weakness, lethargy, and easy bruising, were often diagnosed with a disease called
scurvy. Another example is cholera, which was a disease attributed to individuals presenting with
an acute-onset of severe vomiting, diarrhea, sunken eyes, and labored breathing, which often re-
sulted in death. While these diseases were associated with a cluster of symptoms the presence and
severity of each symptom often varied from patient to patient.
Once a disease trait is specified, a second question can be pursued which involves (2) how
to identify disease etiology or the factors that cause a given disease. In the 18th and early-19th
century, most diseases were thought to involve long lists of causal factors. These causes were in-
terpreted in the context of various disease theories, including humoral, miasmatic, contagion, and
nervous system accounts. Humoral theories originated with ancient Greek medicine and involved
the view that disease resulted from an imbalance of the four humors of the body (blood, phlegm,
black bile, and yellow bile). Miasmatic theories maintained that immaterial, noxious gases–called
“miasmas”–spontaneously emanated from rotting material and caused various epidemics. Conta-
gion theories, on the other hand, attributed these epidemics to material contaminants that were
physically transmitted from patient to patient. Finally, nervous system theories viewed disease
as a byproduct of various dysfunctions of the nervous system. The disease causes postulated by
these theories were often divided into either predisposing or exciting factors, which had different
types of causal influence over disease. Predisposing factors merely increased disease susceptibility,
while exciting factors were triggers that provided a higher likelihood of disease occurrence. This
predisposing/exciting framework supported a multicausal understanding of disease by expanding
the scope of factors that were viewed as disease causes. In particular, this framework included reli-
gious, climate, astronomical, and moral considerations as causally relevant to disease. For example,
this approach viewed disease causes as including religious considerations like prayer and faith in
God, as a lack of either could predispose to disease by producing a stressed disposition (Tesh 1988,
17), (Smith 2002, 922). A similar rationale was used to view disease causes as including weather
and environmental factors, such as dampness and cold, astronomical factors like the location of
the planets, and immoral factors including drug use and other “debauched habits” of the “lowest
caste” (Harrison 2013, 15). There was often little consensus on which factors were predisposing
or exciting causes and what combination of each was required to produce disease. Nevertheless,
standard views maintained that many causal factors were operative in producing disease, where
these factors were supported by different theories and capable of having different types of causal
influence.
Consider how diseases like scurvy and cholera were explained within this multicausal framework.
Scurvy was said to be caused by factors that included: poor hygiene, putrefaction of the humors,
indolence, drug use, moist air, bad water, a diet lacking in fresh vegetables, depression, and a
lack of discipline (Harrison 2013). Similarly, cholera was attributed to a lack of exercise, excessive
alcohol consumption, a lack of religious belief, noxious air, bacterial infection, mental exhaustion,
and a lack of nourishing food (Smith 2002). This framework is characterized by multicausally in
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at least two ways. First, it maintained that a given instance of disease was produced by many
causal factors and, second, that different instances of the same disease were produced by different
combinations of causes in different patients.
This multicausal framework involved a number of challenges. First, this framework made it
difficult to provide concise characterizations of etiology, because so many causal factors were viewed
as relevant to disease. Second, it was often difficult to reach consensus on the relevant etiological
factors, because they could vary across instances of the same disease. In other words, there was no
stable set of causes for a given disease category. Relatedly, even for a single case of disease it was
not entirely clear how to identify which factors produced the disease and which did not. For any
situation in which disease presented one could always find more and more factors to include in the
etiology without there being a clear basis for excluding any. This led to a very “flexible” disease
model that could fit any situation because it “could accommodate virtually any pattern of observed
data” (Smith 2002, 922). While this flexibility allowed the model to accommodate any situation it
prevented the model from being useful in various ways. One example of this, is that despite being
able to “explain” disease after the fact, this framework could not provide information relevant to
predicting or controlling disease before it occurred. The long lists of causal factors identified within
this multicausal framework led to an equally long list of factors that could be targeted to potentially
cure, treat, and prevent disease outcomes. For example, this led to therapies like avoiding cold and
damp climates, bloodletting to restore the balance of the humors, prayer meetings and religious
fasts, forced blistering of the skin to correct overstimulation of the nerves (vessiculation), eating
fresh fruits and vegetables, avoiding alcohol, keeping flowers and burning tar and pitch to purify
the air of miasmas, and avoiding dirty water due to potential contagions (Tesh 1988, 18), (Smith
2002, 922). While some of these therapies had limited success, most of them failed to provide any
control over disease outcomes (and some even exacerbated disease).
Things began to change considerably around the mid-to-late 19th-century. At this time ad-
vances in experimental methods, laboratory techniques, and views on bacterial species encouraged
further examination of contagionist accounts of disease. It was discovered that livestock who fell ill
with anthrax–a disease associated with fever, swelling, difficulty breathing and eventually death–
often had large rod-shaped particles in their blood, which were thought to be bacteria. It was not
clear if these particles were causative, associative, or mere by-products of the disease. In a land-
mark set of experiments Robert Koch demonstrated that these particles were a single species of
bacteria and that when pure cultures of these bacteria (or their spores) were inoculated into animal
models they reliably contracted the disease (Koch 1876). In particular, this research showed that
the disease always occurred after the introduction of a specific bacterial species and that it never
occurred without it. Koch claimed that this step-wise procedure, referred to today as “Koch’s
postulates,” was “proof” that this bacteria was the cause of anthrax and in little time most con-
temporary researchers agreed with him. Similar experiments were performed with tuberculosis,
diphtheria, and cholera, and in each of these cases distinct bacterial species were identified as the
causes of these diseases. This led to a “germ theory” model where single bacterial contagions were
viewed as the main causes of particular diseases.
This 19th century germ theory model began gaining favorable attention and it would eventually
overshadow earlier multicausal theories of disease. Modern analyses claim that this model is guided
by the “doctrine of specific etiology” and that it was quickly accepted by the contemporary research
community. As Dubos states, “[t]here is no more spectacular phenomenon in the history of medicine
than the rapidity with which the germ theory of disease became accepted by the medical profession”
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(Dubos 1965, 324). Why was this theory so quickly accepted? What types of specificity does it is
contain and why are they important, if they are at all? I address these questions by relying on an
expectation that has been present in medical reasoning from the 18th century to modern times–viz.
the expectation that disease causes should have control over disease outcomes.
3 The “Germ Theory” of Disease: An etiological framework. The expectation that
causes control their effects is found in many contexts of causal reasoning, including medical con-
texts from the 18th century to modern times. One notable feature of the 19th century germ theory
model is that it identified factors as disease causes when they provided causal control over disease
outcomes. The relevant notion of “causal control” that I have in mind is helpfully clarified by Wood-
ward’s (2003) interventionist account of causation and it can be understood in the following manner:
(I) X has causal control over Y if and only if an intervention that changes the value of X (and no
other variable) in background circumstances B results in a change in the value of Y.
This account relies on the notion of an ideal intervention. An ideal intervention involves an uncon-
founded manipulation of X with respect to Y where the changes in Y are produced by changes in
X and not through any other variable. In other words, this intervention on X: (i) is not correlated
with another variable W that causes Y, (ii) it does not directly cause Y, and (iii) it does not influ-
ence any of the causal intermediates between X and Y (Woodward 2003). This ensures that when
X is manipulated and changes in Y are identified that the changes in Y are caused by X and not
some other factor. It is important to note that the notion of an ideal intervention is not restricted
to those interventions that we can actually perform. This captures the fact that we often make
causal claims about factors that we cannot actually manipulate.2 In these cases we often consider
hypothetical interventions in the sense that if an candidate cause were manipulated some effect
variable would change.3 In applying this framework to a simple case of disease causation we can
think of X as a candidate cause and Y as a disease trait, where each variable can take on the values
(0,1) representing the absence and presence of each entity. If X is a cause of Y it should be the
case that intervening on X to change its value produces changes in the value of Y.
This account helps clarify why earlier multicausal theories of disease were so unsatisfying. The
causal factors identified by these theories were expected to have control over disease outcomes, but
they often failed to meet this standard. Furthermore, some of these causes were defined in ways that
evaded scientific examination and consideration. For example, while disease-causing miasmas were
understood to be immaterial gases there was a sense in which no conceivable intervention could
possibly manipulate such a non-physical, non-material factor. The same could be said for religious
considerations such as evil spirits and disease-causing demons. With no way to even conceive of
(much less carry out) interventions on these “supernatural” factors the question of whether they
played a causal role in disease or not could not be experimentally tested or even rendered into
sensible scientific framework.
2For example, we make casual claims about past events which we cannot intervene on (yesterday the rain
caused flooding) or current events which are beyond our technological capacity for actual intervention (such
as, the location of the moon causing changes in the tides).
3This involves a counterfactual claim (if X were to be changed, then Y would be produced), which is why this
is often called a counterfactual account of causation. In the rest of this paper, when I discuss interventionist
control I mean hypothetical causal control in this sense.
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Alternatively, the reasoning behind the germ theory model and its quick acceptance by this
scientific community are well-explained by the interventionist account. The experiments used to
support this model represent a paradigmatic interventionist experiment–they involve intervening
on a candidate cause (a type of bacteria) with respect to an effect of interest (a particular disease).
As manipulating the presence and absence of the bacteria controls whether the disease manifests or
not the bacteria is viewed as a cause of this disease. This experimental evidence refuted common
claims that bacteria were simply harmless contaminants or uninteresting byproducts of the disease
process. Furthermore, it makes sense that factors with interventionist control would be of interest
to medical researchers given the goals of this scientific community. Factors that control disease
outcomes can be targeted to create successful treatments and preventions and they can explain
why particular communities have disease outbreaks while others do not.
3.1 Single cause specificity: Monocausal etiology. In addition to meeting the intervention-
ist criterion (I) causes identified by the germ theory model also have particular types of specificity
at the level of etiology. One type of specificity that is present in this model is what I call single
cause specificity. This can be characterized as follows:
Single cause specificity (S1): for a given instance of disease D a single factor C causes D in the
sense of (I).
This type of specificity maintains that a single factor C has interventionist control over an instance
of disease D, where the contrastive focus of D is the presence (1) and absence (0) of the disease.
This contrasts with a situation where multiple factors interact together to provide this type of
control over D. To be clear, this type of specificity (S1) does not deny the possibility of dividing
up the causal process between C and D into a sequence of multiple causal intermediates.4 What it
does deny is that there are other factors–off this path–that also have interventionist control over
the disease. What about factors such as oxygen, the immune system, and genes? Don’t these
factors play a causal role in all diseases and, thus, figure in the multicausal etiology of any disease?
Notice that we do not typically cite these factors as causing infectious diseases such as tuberculosis,
anthrax, and cholera. The reason for this is that we do not know of any immune or genetic factors
that would provide causal control over these infectious diseases when (hypothetically) manipulated.
When these factors are manipulated they can control a variety of outcomes (including whether an
organism lives or dies, as in the case of oxygen) but they lack control over the effect of interest, viz.
the presence and absence of disease in question.5 There is a sense in which these immune and genetic
factors are necessary background conditions for bacterial contagions to exert the causal control that
they have, but such immune and genetic factors lack this type of control themselves. This reasoning
does not deny that immune and genetic factors cause some diseases–in fact, they meet the single
cause specificity (S1) standard for diseases like pemphigus and cystic fibrosis, respectively.
6.
4In fact, disease etiology is sometimes depicted as a linear process where upstream causes represent the
“etiological” factors and the causal intermediates represent the “pathological” process. However, these
terms are sometimes used synonymously and often without much clarity (Wullf and Gotzsche 2000, 55).
5A similar point is made by (Meehl 1977, 38).
6For example, immune cells are cited as causing the disease pemphigus where they produce antibodies that
target and damage an anchoring protein in the skin (desmosomes), which results in a pathologic blistering
of the skin associated with this disease. Relatedly, mutations in single genes are cited as causing various
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Diseases that meet this type of specificity (S1) have a monocausal etiology in the sense that
they can be controlled by single causal factors. Most interpretations of germ theory and the
doctrine of specific etiology involve this “monocausal” or single cause view. Additionally, these
interpretations often claim that germ theory expected all diseases to meet this monocausal standard.
For example, germ theory is said to involve the view that “that every disease has a single specific
cause” (Cockerham and Richey 1997, 35) and that “[i]f you find that cause, you can control the
disease” (Agar 1994, 394).7 While 19th century researchers certainly viewed this monocausal
standard as applying to the infectious diseases they studied it is not clear that they viewed it as
a universal standard that all diseases should meet. Nevertheless, as I suggest below, there are
features of this germ theory framework that do apply to diseases more generally.
If we look to modern medicine we find that many diseases meet this type of specificity (S1).
These examples do not just include the infectious diseases that this model began with, but also
nutritional, genetic, viral, immunologic, and parasitic diseases.8 This reveals a lasting presence of
the monocausal framework in modern medicine and its extension to a wider range of cases than
those it was originally applied to. However, while some diseases fit this model others clearly do
not. Some diseases are produced by multiple interacting factors that share control over disease
occurence. Consider the case of phenylketouria (PKU), which is a neurologic disorder involving
severe brain damage. The occurrence of this disease is controlled by both a gene variant and a
dietary factor. Both of these factors meet the interventionist criterion (I), but their causal control
is dependent on each other.9 The gene variant only provides control when the dietary factor is
present and the dietary factor only provides control when the gene is present. Gaining control
over this disease requires manipulating both factors. PKU does not fit the monocausal framework,
because instances of this disease are controlled by multiple, as opposed to single, causal factors.
If the notion of monocausal etiology does not apply to diseases more generally this might suggest
that the germ theory model is quite limited in application and that it lacks significant bearing on
modern medicine. This is a common view in the literature.10 This position overlooks an important
principle that originates with germ theory and that applies more broadly to disease causation–the
goal of identifying factors that provide control over disease outcomes, however many factors are
required to meet this goal. In contrast with the notion of monocausal etiology, this principle involves
the notion of causal etiology, which refers to the selection of disease causes on the basis of their
control over disease outcomes without specifying the number of causes involved. This perspective
maintains that the success of germ theory did not just lie in the identification of single causes,
but in identifying causes with control over disease. This is a key feature that distinguishes this
theory from earlier multicausal views. Of course, for the diseases that germ theory was originally
diseases, as is the case with cystic fibrosis. For further discussion of the rationale that guides selection of
single disease causes, see Ross (Forthcoming).
7Other statements of this monocausal interpretation can be found in: (Locker 2003, 19), (Stewart 1968,
1077), (Aronowitz 1998, 196), (Stephenson 1985, 355), and (Dubos 1959, 102).
8For example, consider (a) scurvy, (b) Huntington’s disease, (c) chicken pox, (d) pemphigus, and (e) gia-
rdiasis, respectively. These are all diseases that are viewed as having single causal factors. These causes
include: (a) a deficiency of vitamin C, (b) a mutation in the huntingtin gene, (c) the varicella virus, (d)
antibodies toward an anchoring protein in the skin (desmosomes), and (e) the parasite Giardia lamblia,
respectively.
9In other words, they are interacting causes.
10For expressions of this view, see: (Blaxter 1990, 4) (Broadbent 2009, 305) (Broadbent 2013, 161) (Stewart
1968) and (Rothstein 2003, 223).
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applied to single factors just so happened to provide this control. However, for other diseases like
PKU the same principle applies and functions to guide the identification of multiple causes. This
notion of causal etiology has wide applicability in medicine and it remains a feature of our modern
conception of disease etiology.
Before moving on it will help to relate this analysis to a common criticism of the germ the-
ory model. The germ theory model–and its monocausal character–receive heavy criticism in the
philosophical, historical, and medical literature, on the grounds that most (if not all) diseases have
multicausal as opposed to monocausal etiologies. These criticisms are often coupled with a partic-
ular story about the development of modern medicine. In particular, it is frequently suggested that
in modern medicine we now have an accurate, sophisticated, and well-informed multicausal view,
which is a response to the “oversimplified,” immature, and “inchoate” monocausal framework of
germ theory (Loomis and Wing 1990, 2) (Broadbent 2013, 161). This characterization is often used
to rationalize the development of our modern multicausal understanding of disease and give it a
clear contrast with a the “naiveties” of earlier disease theories (Broadbent 2013, 302). However,
this characterization appears narrow-sighted when one appreciates the history and motivation that
led up to the 19th century germ theory of disease. This is in part, because we had a multicausal
theory of disease well before the 19th century germ theory was ever established, but it didn’t work
very well. In fact, in many ways germ theory was a response to an overly flexible multicausal
framework and part of its success involved applying stricter requirements for what counted as a
disease cause–at the very least, requiring that these factors control disease outcomes. The fact
that we still see this requirement in modern disease theories–when single or multiple causal factors
are involved–reveals the lasting influence of this view. Germ theory is largely responsible for this
shift from a more flexible conception of disease etiology to one that maintains that disease causes
should provide control over disease outcomes. A key to appreciating the influence of germ theory
on modern medicine requires identifying its focus on labeling factors as causes when they provided
control over disease outcomes–a feature that earlier multicausal theories lacked. This principle is
inherent to the selection of single and multiple factors as disease causes in modern medicine, but
the origination of this principle with germ theory has not been sufficiently acknowledged in the
literature.
3.2 Shared cause specificity: Shared etiology The 19th century germ theory model in-
volves a second type of specificity, which has received little to no attention in the philosophical
literature. I refer to this as shared cause specificity and it can be characterized as follows:
Shared cause specificity (S2): for all instances of disease D the same factor C or the same combi-
nation of factors (C1, C2,....Cn) cause every instance of D in the sense of (I).
This type of specificity ensures that a population-wide disease trait has a homogeneous etiology in
the sense that every case of the disease is produced by the same causal factors. Notice that the
infectious diseases originally studied with the germ theory model meet this standard. For example,
all cases of anthrax are caused by the anthrax bacterium. Shared cause specificity does not pertain
to the number of factors that cause an instance of disease–it has to do with to whether these factors
are the same or different across all instances of the disease in question. Thus, diseases do not need
to meet the monocausal model in order to satisfy S2.
11 This is seen in the case of PKU, which
11In other words, single cause specificity and shared cause specificity are not mutually exclusive. Suppose
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satisfies S2 because every case of this disease is caused by the same two factors. Shared cause
specificity contrasts with a situation where distinct instances of the same disease are caused by
different, heterogeneous factors. This situation of heterogeneous etiology was common in 18th and
early-19th century explanations of disease. At this time, for example, it was thought that different
cases of cholera were caused by completely different combinations of causal factors. Germ theory,
on the other hand, conflicted with this heterogeneity and involved shared cause specificity–it viewed
this disease as having a shared etiology where all cases of the disease were caused by a particular
bacterium (the comma bacilli).
Diseases that meet this type of specificity (S2) have a shared etiology in the sense that the
causes across all instances of the disease are shared. Why should this be viewed as a type of
specificity? Both S1 and S2 are forms of causal specificity in the sense that they identify something
singular about a causal process given an effect of interest. S1 refers to a single cause for a particular
instance of disease, while S2 refers to a single set of causes for all instances of a given disease.
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Identifying a shared etiology for some disease trait has a number of advantages over situations of
etiologic heterogeneity. As shared etiology identifies causal factors that are common across cases
of a particular disease these factors can be targeted to explain and potentially control most or all
of the cases of the disease in the entire population. Alternatively, if a disease fails to meet S2
and has a heterogeneous etiology, these advantages are lost. In this situation any single factor or
combination of factors will only pertain to a subset of all of instances of a given disease, as opposed
to most or all of them.
In modern medicine, the notion of shared etiology is often referred to as a “causal signature”
(Murphy 2006, 105), “disorder-specific pathophysiology” (Caspi and Moffitt 2006, 586) “shared
causal process” (Zachar 2014, 87), “shared pathogenesis” and “unifying cause” or “unifying the-
oretical underpinning” for a given disease (Egger 2012, 1). In the context of our current medical
theories, there is a common default assumption that diseases–insofar as they are understood or
classified etiologically–should have shared etiologies in the sense of S2. Shared etiology is often
used to justify divisions between disease categories on the grounds that distinct etiologies represent
distinct diseases.13 In order to see this, consider the example of Parkinson’s disease. Fairly recently,
researchers discovered that distinct cases of Parkinson’s disease are caused by completely different
causal factors (i.e. that it has a heterogeneous etiology).14 When researchers discovered this, they
each case of anthrax has a single cause, but that there are different causes across cases (e.g. five different
bacteria are individually sufficient to produce this disease). This is a situation that meets S1 but not S2.
Alternatively, consider a situation where every single case of anthrax is produced by multiple causes, but
these causes are the same across all cases of the disease. This is a situation that meets S2, but not S1.
Our accepted explanation of anthrax meets both of these standards–we view the disease as caused by a
single bacterial species (S1), where every disease instance has the same cause (S2). A situation that meets
neither standard would involve their being multiple causes for each instance of disease (lack of S1), where
these causes differed across cases (lack of S2). Multicausal theories of disease in the 18th and 19th C often
fall into this final category and meet neither type of specificity.
12As can be seen, these types of specificity operate at the level of token and type-level phenomena (or
explanatory targets), respectively.
13As Calne states, “[a]etiology is a fundamental criterion for the delineation of individual diseases” (Calne
1989, 18).
14Parkinson’s disease can be caused by (i) single gene variants, (ii) single environmental factors (such as the
drug MPTP, pesticides, and even viral encephalitis), and (iii) combinations of genetic and environmental
factors.
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viewed it as a significant problem for explaining and understanding this disease and they suggested
dividing-up this disorder on the basis of these factors. In fact, they claimed that “it would be
helpful to replace ‘Parkinson’s disease’ with a term that is not saddled with implications of a single
causal mechanism” (Calne 1989, 18). Notice that referring to a condition as a disease implies that
it is produced by a “single causal mechanism,” where this does not refer to a single causal factor,
but rather a single set of causes that are common across instances of the same disease. Referring
to each of these cases as “Parkinson’s disease” was viewed as problematic, because they lacked a
shared etiology which disease traits are often expected to have. This expectation is captured by
Meehl, who states that “[i]t is counterintuitive to speak of two ‘specific’ etiologies for the same
disease” (Meehl 1977, 44). Thus, when a disease trait is identified as having a heterogeneous etiol-
ogy, it is often suggested to divide-up the trait on the basis of these heterogeneous factors, because
this would allow it to conform to the shared etiology standard.15 Notice what means researchers
are willing to go to in order to satisfy this standard–they are willing to completely change the
conception and classification of disease traits.
Shared etiology is also used to justify the identification of “valid” or “legitimate” disease traits
and categories.16 In fact, when medical researchers use the term “validity” they often explicitly
rely on the notion of shared etiology.17 Consider psychiatric disorders which are based on shared
symptoms, but often lack known or identifiable etiologies. In these cases, there is a common
worry that these categories might group together patients with similar symptomology, but different
etiologies. If this were the case, these categories would be subject to modification and would
be redrawn in accordance with the shared etiology standard. However, as the causes of these
disorders remain “stubbornly out of reach” whether they are valid or not remains an unanswered
question until their causes are better understood.18 This leads researchers to view these categories
as characterized by “instability” (Kendler and Zachar 2008, 370), as “provisional” (Kendell and
Jablensky 2003, 4) and as representing disease traits that are “open concept[s]” (Meehl 1977, 34)
which have yet to be sufficiently verified and accepted by the medical community. Skepticism about
these disease categories does not just involve worries about heterogeneous etiology, but also worries
about the lack of any etiological understanding of these disorders. Although common symptom
profiles are used as a first-pass method for discovering diseases, these traits are not considered
valid or legitimate until their etiologies are identified. The relevant notion of etiology here, is
15Researchers also suggest continuing to search for some shared etiology that unifies these heterogeneous
factors, as this would also restore shared causal etiology.
16For an excellent overview of the uses, meanings, and applications of the term “validity” in this context,
see (Schaffner 2012).
17As Hyman states, “I use the term ‘diagnostic validity’ throughout this review...as shorthand to signify
definitions that capture families of closely related disorders with similar pathophysiology” (Hyman 2010,
162).
18One method used in attempts to uncover the etiologies of psychiatric disorders–and subsequently change
their characterization and classification–are genome wide association studies (GWAS). Researchers claim
that “carefully designed GWAS with thorough phenotypic characterization have the potential to redefine
disease classification” on the basis of identifying “distinct underlying pathological mechanisms” (Detels,
Gulliford, Abdool Karim, and Chuan Tan 2015, 565). It is further claimed, that for “complex diseases
that have previously been regarded as distinct clinical entities, GWAS findings may point to common
underlying disease processes and a shared pathogenesis” (Detels, Gulliford, Abdool Karim, and Chuan Tan
2015, 565). The assumption that diseases should meet the shared etiology standard (and notion of shared
cause specificity) is seen in these quotes.
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derived from germ theory and refers to factors that meet the causal etiology and shared etiology
standards. Part of what this reveals is that germ theory has not just influenced our modern-day
conception of etiology–it has also influenced how we conceive of and classify disease traits. This
is because we expect valid disease traits to meet these etiological standards. This is expressed by
Hull, when he claims that “[i]n efforts to understand, control, and avoid disease, modern medicine
has incorporated into the very identification of disease the notion of the cause of the syndrome.
This permits the individuation of similar syndromes with distinct causes into different diseases”
(Hull 1979, 61). Relatedly, for psychiatric conditions, the lack of some identifiable causal etiology
leaves many to question whether a “valid” disease has been identified. This is expressed by the
dominant view in medicine that “if you cannot explain a distinct and unambiguous etiology for a
syndrome, preferably in biological terms, then you do not have a real disorder” (Kendler 2012, 1).
This view does not deny that individuals “really” suffer from and experience psychiatric disease.
Instead, it denies that our conception and categorization of these diseases will remain stable and
fixed as we learn more about their etiologies. In other words, “real” disorders are stable disorders
and stable disorders have identifiable shared causal etiologies. This is why psychiatry is often
referred to as a premature, “embryonic,” or “nascent” science, which is in its “early stages” and
a continuous “state of flux”–it has yet to uncover the etiologies of psychiatric disorders, which is
viewed as a requirement for valid disease traits in modern medicine (Hyman 2010, 151), (Hyman
2002, 140),(Hyman 2010, 171) (Kendell and Jablensky 2003, 4), (Jablensky 2005, 202).
Surely some diseases do not meet the shared etiology standard. What about conditions such as
cancer, high blood pressure, and headache? Don’t these all represent cases where the same disease
can be caused by different factors? Shared causal etiology is a standard applied to etiological
conceptions and classifications of disease, but there are other ways to conceive of and classify
diseases that need not meet this standard. For example, we sometimes classify disease traits
on the basis of anatomic location, physiological subsystem, widespread malfunction, or form of
trauma, because these are useful in various contexts.19 Additionally, various signs, symptoms,
and injuries are often referred to as diseases, despite failing to meet the shared etiology standard.
So first, the claim that diseases are often expected to meet shared etiology does not deny that
some helpful categorizations do not abide by this. This is because not all categorizations are
guided by etiology. Second, researchers often distinguish these conditions that are colloquially
referred to as diseases from traditional, etiological conceptions of disease. In other words, many
of these counterexample categories are not viewed as properly representing individual or single
disease traits. Instead they often group together multiple conditions that are viewed as distinct
diseases (as in the case of cancer) or they pick out particular features, which are viewed as one
of many symptoms associated with a single disease (as in the case of headache). The distinction
between these purported counterexample cases and a traditional, etiological conception of disease
has motivated researchers to suggest limiting the use of the term “disease.” As Stehbens states:
“The word disease must be restricted in usage to indicate a specific malady and not
used carelessly or synonymously with (1) symptoms, signs, or laboratory findings, e.g.,
headache, hypertension, pyrexia, hypercholesterolemia; (2) nonspecific complications,
19As Calne states, “[d]iseases have been been grouped wherever there are any common features that facilitate
discussing them for the purposes of teaching, diagnosis, treatment, or research. But the factors that provide
cohesion for each of these disciplines are totally different, so it is not surprising that the classification is so
heterogeneous” (Calne 1989, 19).
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e.g., embolism, hemorrhage, ischemia, necrosis; and (3) a group or class of pathological
states, e.g., stroke, subarachnoid hemorrhage, myocardial ischemia, CHD. Each is a
manifestation of several diseases and not a final diagnosis in itself, even though often
regarded as such clinically” (Stehbens 1992, 98).
This suggests that there is resistance in the medical community toward viewing these purported
counterexample cases as legitimate single disease categories. Furthermore, even if these cases are
viewed as legitimate disease examples, I am content with restricting my analysis to the influence
of germ on the this traditional, etiological conception of disease.
3.3 Further comments: Specificity of clinical presentation. This analysis has considered
two forms of specificity in the germ theory model: single cause and shared cause specificity. These
types of specificity are present at the level of disease causation or etiology. Consider another form
of specificity, which has to do with disease effects or outcomes: specificity of clinical presentation.
Specificity of clinical presentation can be taken as referring to a specific set of symptoms that
reliably occur in cases of a given disease. Despite common claims, this type of specificity is not
present in the germ theory model.20 Diseases that meet the etiological standards outlined by
germ theory lack specific clinical presentations–symptomology can differ across cases of the same
disease and it can be similar across cases of different diseases. This is also true of modern disease
traits that meet these etiological standards.21 In other words, shared causal etiology does not
reliably track specific, repeatable symptoms patterns and, relatedly, symptom patterns alone do not
reliably distinguish etiologically-distinct disease traits. This clarifies two ways in which information
regarding symptomology (or clinical presentation) is limited in particular kinds of medical decision-
making. The variability (or non-specificity) of symptoms with respect to etiologically defined disease
traits means that more information than just symptomology is often needed to diagnose a patient
with a particular disease.22 This makes sense of how difficult diagnosis is in modern medicine,
where if diseases did have specific clinical presentations one would think that this would be much
easier. This also makes sense of the fact that, although we often use symptom clusters as a first step
in identifying new diseases, we view these diseases as tentative and we subject them to significant
scrutiny, because symptomology alone does not provide a guarantee of shared, causal etiology,
which is what disease traits are often expected to meet. These points are discussed further in the
following section.
4 Influence on modern medicine. I have outlined three key features of the 19th century germ
theory of disease. Within this framework, disease causes meet the interventionist criterion, single
cause specificity, and shared cause specificity. Single cause specificity and shared cause specificity
correspond to the notions of monocausal etiology and shared etiology, respectively. Furthermore,
20For these claims see (Rothstein 2003, 222) and (Blaxter 1990, 4).
21For example, two patients with tuberculosis can present with completely different symptoms, while a
patient with tuberculosis and a patient with asthma can present with the same symptoms.
22Pathognomonic signs are an exception to this claim as they are signs that are unique to particular diseases.
Examples of this include koplik spots, which are oral lesions found only in cases of measles. As pathognomic
signs are unique to particular diseases their identification often allows for an immediate and reliable
diagnosis, without needing to consult other information. These signs are highly useful for diagnostic
purposes, but they are also extremely uncommon. Most diseases do not have pathognomic signs.
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I have suggested that monocausal etiology is importantly related to the notion of causal etiology.
Both refer to factors with control over disease instances, but the monocausal case maintains that
one factor provides this control, where the causal case does not specify how many factors provide it.
This leaves us with three important features of germ theory: it identifies factors as disease causes
when they meet (a) the interventionist criterion, (b) causal etiology, and (c) shared etiology. These
standards for disease causation are far more stringent than those present in earlier multicausal
theories of disease and they help capture how etiology is understood within the germ theory model.
I refer to these three features as the “shared causal” etiology standard or characterization of etiology.
How has germ theory influenced modern medicine, if it has at all? In modern medicine, the
notion of etiology is inherent to how diseases are understood and studied. This orientation is referred
to as the “hard medical model” by Kendler and the “medical model” or “biomedical model” by
Engel and others (Kendler 2012, 1) (Engel 2009, 39), (Mishler 1981, 1-3). A core feature of this
model is the view that disease traits and categories are legitimate to the extent that their causal
etiologies are well-understood. What is meant by etiology is something similar to the shared causal
etiology conception, which originated with germ theory. In fact, when scientists discuss the hard
medical model they often refer back to germ theory and the diseases it was originally applied to.23
However, the influence of germ theory is not just seen in our modern understanding of etiology. As
etiology plays a central role in how diseases are classified, defined, and discovered, the influence of
germ theory can be seen in all of these projects. I discuss these points in more detail below.
First, our modern conception of etiology has been significantly influenced by the etiological
framework that originated with germ theory. While 18th and early 19th century theories were
very permissive in what was viewed as causally relevant to disease, germ theory established a more
rigorous set of standards that are similar to those present in medicine today. These standards
are captured by the notion of shared causal etiology–the expectation that disease causes provide
control over disease outcomes, where these factors are shared across cases of the same disease.
Modern medicine has adopted this restricted view of etiology and disease causation, in the sense
that not just any factors are viewed as disease causes. When candidate factors lack causal control
over disease traits or cannot conceivably or hypothetically be manipulated, their role in disease
causation is denied. When heterogeneous causes are identified for a given disease, efforts are made
to divide-up the disease category or find other shared (or unifying) causes, so that the shared
etiology standard is met. Finally, when there are absolutely no identifiable factors that meet these
standards, medical researchers admit that they have a disease of “unknown etiology,” which is
viewed as a tentative disease trait until suitable causes are identied. These standards explain the
selectiveness of the medical community in identifying etiological factors, but also how they reach
consensus on exactly which factors these are. This etiological framework provides an answer to
the second question mentioned in the beginning of this paper, which is (2) how to identify disease
etiology or the factors that cause a given disease. Once a disease trait is identified, disease etiology
is comprised of those factors that meet the shared causal etiology standard. The germ theory model
provided a novel answer to this question, which is similar to the answer we continue to give today.
Second, by influencing our modern understanding of etiology, germ theory has also shaped how
we classify disease traits, because we often expect proper disease categories to track shared causal
etiologies. This explains why scholars claim that germ theory “placed disease classification on a
radical new footing” (Aronowitz 1998, 13) and that it “led to the redefinition and reclassification
23For examples of this, see: (Kendler 2012, 2), (Ahmed and Kolker 1979, 115), and (Suls and Wallston 2003,
xi).
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of many disease entities by the criterion of cause” (Susser 1973, 23). In many ways, germ theory
was the origination of our modern use of and preference for cause-based classifications of disease,
in contrast with those that are symptom-based. Cause-based classifications are valued in medicine,
in part, because they identify factors that can potentially allow for treatments, preventions, and
cures. Alternatively, symptom-based classifications can usually only suggest therapies that provide
symptom-relief without targeting the root cause of disease. Symptom-based classification is still
present in modern-medicine for diseases that have poorly understood etiologies. In these cases, the
categories are viewed as temporary placeholders until etiology is better understood. The sense in
which etiology is the accepted guideline for disease classification, despite the need for temporary
reliance on a symptom-based approach, is discussed by Hyman in the following quote:
In disease classification, the gold standard is either etiology or etiology modified by
pathophysiology....For mental disorders, etiologic and pathophysiologic information is
still sparse and thus cannot yet yield valid disease definitions. The result is a classifi-
cation based, of necessity, on phenomenology (Hyman 2010, 161).
This symptom-based classification is sometimes referred to as involving “phenomenology” in the
sense of merely describing the surface phenomena of these disorders, without making reference to
their causes. While disease classification in mainstream medicine is viewed as “theoretical,” the
classification of psychiatric disorders is referred to as “atheoretical” (Kendler 2012, 1) “descriptive”
(Pritchard 2015, 8) and as relying on the “surface characteristics” (Hyman 2010, 161) of disease.
As suggested by Hyman’s quote, etiology is often viewed as the theoretical backbone of modern
disease classification. Relatedly, germ theory has also influenced how we conceive of and define
legitimate disease traits, because we expect these traits to have shared causal etiologies. This is
seen in the context of psychiatry, where disorders lacking this type of etiology are not viewed as
“real” or legitimate diseases. Hyman mentions this in the quote above, in claiming that etiology
guides “valid disease definitions.” Part of what is so impressive about this, is that it reveals how an
understanding of etiology–or disease causes–has actually influenced how we think disease effects or
disease traits should be properly understood. This is because we view valid and legitimate disease
traits as those traits that meet the shared causal etiology standard. In other words, the notion
of etiology that originated with germ theory has influenced how we conceive of and understand
what diseases traits are (or how they should be understood). Thus, while the etiological framework
of germ theory provided an explicit answer to question (2) it also implicitly answered question
(1), which is how to identify and characterize distinct disease traits for the purposes of etiological
understanding. This is because current medical theory maintains that the ideal way to identify
and characterize distinct disease traits is on the basis of shared causal etiologies. Until disease
traits meet this standard, they are viewed as tentative conceptions that require further study to be
accepted.
A third and final main influence of germ theory relates to the process of disease discovery.
Germ theory captures a process of disease discovery that is still present in modern medicine. This
process involves two main steps, first (4.1) identifying a shared cluster or pattern of symptoms and
second (4.2) searching for (and hopefully) identifying the shared causal etiology for that cluster.
This process is discussed by Kety and Engel in following quote:
“ ‘The medical model of an illness is a process that moves from the recognition and
palliation of symptoms to the characterization of a specific disease in which the etiology
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and pathogenesis are known and treatment is rational and specific.’ Thus taxonomy
progresses from symptoms, to clusters of symptoms, to syndromes, and finally to dis-
eases with specific pathogenesis and pathology. This sequence accurately describes the
successful application of the scientific method to the elucidation and classification into
discrete entities of disease in its generic sense. The merit of such an approach needs
no argument” (Kety 1974, 959) (Engel 2009, 42).
In the first step of this process, repeatable symptom clusters are identified and used as potential
guides in identifying etiologically distinct disease traits.24 This first step represents an “early stage
of knowledge” (Meehl 1977) where diseases are identified on the basis of “descriptive” (Pritchard
2015, 8), “surface characteristics,” which are not viewed as an accurate “mirror of nature” (Hyman
2010, 161,158). This stage captures the “soft medical model” (Kendler 2012, 1) where diseases are
merely “open concepts” (Meehl 1977, 34) that are defined and classified within a symptom-based
framework. A main goal in disease discovery is to get to the second stage where shared, causal
etiologies are discovered for these traits. Most psychiatric disorders are stuck in the first stage
of disease discovery, because while they are associated with particular symptom clusters, their
etiologies have not yet been identified.25 Reaching this second stage of disease discovery represents
an “advanced state of knowledge” where disease traits are viewed as legitimate and valid on the
grounds that their etiologies are understood (Meehl 1977, 51). Advancing though this two-step
process captures the “hard medical model” (Kendler 2012, 1) and the standard view in medicine
that “symptoms should be traced to underlying causal processes” (Murphy 2006, 107). These
causal processes are often expected to be shared causal etiologies in the sense that originated with
the germ theory model.
5 Conclusion. This paper has examined “the doctrine of specific etiology”–a principle that
is said to underlie the 19th century germ theory model of disease. Not only is this principle
associated with the success of this theory, but it is frequently cited as an important change in
medical thinking that has had a profound impact on our modern theories of disease. Despite
these claims, it is not clear what types of specificity this doctrine refers to, why exactly they
matter, and how (if at all) they have influenced modern medicine. This paper has provided an
analysis of this doctrine that addresses these questions. I have suggested that the 19th century
germ theory model involves two types of specificity at the level of causal etiology and that these
led to a conception of “shared causal” etiology, which continues to figure in medicine today. In
particular, this represents our modern understanding of etiology, but as etiology influences how
diseases are classified, defined, and discovered, we see the influence of germ theory in all of these
projects. Germ theory differed from earlier theories of disease in selecting factors as causes when
they provided control over disease outcomes. Of course, identifying factors with control over disease
outcomes supported common goals of the contemporary research community, including the goals of
identifying treatments, preventions, and cures for devastating diseases. It should be unsurprising
that these features of germ theory have persisted, because we have similar goals in modern medicine
and these methods serve them well.
24As Rosenberg states, “[d]isease begins with perceived and often physically manifest symptoms” (Rosenberg
1992, 310).
25Many “physical” medicine diseases are also stuck in this first stage in the sense that their etiologies are not
understood (or are poorly understood). Examples of these diseases include systemic lupus erythematosus
(SLE), Bell’s palsy, and acrocyanosis.
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